Bound by gravity or living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’? Expert knowledge and affective spatial imaginaries in the construction of the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy by Siles-Brügge, Gabriel
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cnpe20
New Political Economy
ISSN: 1356-3467 (Print) 1469-9923 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cnpe20
Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography
Trading World’? Expert Knowledge and Affective
Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s
Post-Brexit Trade Policy
Gabriel Siles-Brügge
To cite this article: Gabriel Siles-Brügge (2018): Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography
Trading World’? Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s
Post-Brexit Trade Policy, New Political Economy, DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2018.1484722
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2018.1484722
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 18 Jun 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 726
View Crossmark data
Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?*
Expert Knowledge and Aﬀective Spatial Imaginaries in the
Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy
Gabriel Siles-Brügge
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
ABSTRACT
A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of
post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either
continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s)
regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to
pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to
much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival
forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not
only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert
knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led
the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric
(‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser
association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic
legitimation, the speciﬁc legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet
advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy
of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy,
closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK
‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly
emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the
UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.
KEYWORDS
Brexit; trade policy; experts;
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Introduction
Although not at the heart of the European Union (EU) membership referendum vote, trade policy has
been central to the post-Brexit vision of leading actors behind the oﬃcial ‘Vote Leave’ campaign. To
these Conservative Eurosceptics, the EU is a protectionist and over-regulated entity that prevents
Britain from embracing its historical free trade vocation and negotiating its own ambitious trade
agreements with the world’s leading economies. Brexit thus represents an opportunity to deepen
the UK’s current ‘national business model’ (NBM) premised on deregulation (Lavery et al. 2017; see
also Rosamond 2018) – and to anchor this in an outward-oriented trade policy. These views have
been subsequently reﬂected in the UK Government’s mantra of a ‘Global Britain’. Shortly after the
referendum, it established the Department for International Trade (DIT) headed by Liam Fox. Sub-
sequently, in her January 2017 Lancaster House Speech, Prime Minister Theresa May (2017a)
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spelled out the UK’s intention to leave the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union to pursue an inde-
pendent trade policy focused on ‘the fastest growing export markets in the world’.
Despite the continued formal commitment to this ‘Global Britain’ vision, the June 2017 snap elec-
tion re-opened rifts in the cabinet between advocates of what are often referred to as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’
Brexit. Post-Brexit UK trade policy has become a central battleground of these inter-Ministerial
conﬂicts. One wing of the cabinet (most prominently represented by International Trade Secretary
Fox, Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Environment Secretary Michael Gove) is keen on extricating
the UK from the Customs Union and Single Market to allow Britain to pursue the ambitious free trade
agreements (FTAs) of Brexiteer imagination. In opposition stand primarily the Treasury and Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer, Phillip Hammond (other opponents also include the Business, Energy and Indus-
trial Strategy Secretary, Greg Clark). They are wary of the costs of leaving the EU customs and
regulatory orbit and are sceptical of the supposed beneﬁts of new FTAs and their ability to compen-
sate for lost trading opportunities in the EU (Parker and Wright 2017). These latter views embrace
aspects of the UK’s current NBM which are anchored in the likes of ﬁnancial services ‘passporting’
and the integration of UK manufacturing into EU supply chains.
In this article, I explore this battle by focusing on the role of expert knowledge in discursively legit-
imating the future direction of the UK’s trade policy (and by extension its NBM). Much has been said
of the denigration of experts in UK policy discourse around Brexit (e.g. Evans and Menon 2017,
pp. 62–63, 108). It has become somewhat of a truism amongst many trade policy commentators
to question the Government’s ‘Global Britain’ mantra, the more speciﬁc policy orientation of DIT
and the competence of its political leadership (e.g. Wolf 2017). What might explain the inﬂuence
in Government circles of what, to these commentators at least, appear to be such patently ‘bad
ideas’?1 One potential answer is oﬀered by Hopkin and Rosamond (2017, p. 3, drawing on Frankfurt
2005), who emphasise the importance of ‘bullshit’: ‘a type of speech act that is not triangulated in
relation to the truth and which proceeds without eﬀective concern for the veracity of the claim in
question’. Bullshit’s simplicity trumps expert opinion where neoliberal depoliticisation processes
have robbed political parties of their role in mediating expert opinion and providing an ideological
compass to guide voter behaviour (Hopkin and Rosamond 2017). Applied to Brexit and UK trade
policy, the argument that Britain, unshackled from Brussels, is now free to engage in ambitious
trade negotiations once again might similarly appear appealing and intuitive, even if roundly
attacked by trade policy ‘experts’.
However, the intra-Government battle on the UK–EU trade arrangement (with its implications for
the future of UK trade policy) appears to be informed by two rival sets of expertise. The Treasury has
traditionally relied on econometric studies using so-called gravity models, more recently also produ-
cing ‘computable general equilibrium’ (CGE) modelling in conjunction with other Government
Departments (Giles 2018). These models emphasise the costs of leaving the Single Market/
Customs Union given the proximity and size of the EU market and/or the cost of erecting new
tariﬀ and (especially) non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) to trade. In contrast, DIT and Liam Fox (and also the
Department for Exiting the EU [DExEU] and its Secretary of State, David Davis) are said to have devel-
oped a close relationship with a particular think tank, the Legatum Institute (with key individuals from
Legatum recently moving to the Institute for Economic Aﬀairs [IEA]). This has proﬀered (predomi-
nantly legal) advice on the possibilities of maintaining regulatory alignment with the EU outside of
its structures, enabling the UK to pursue trade liberalisation opportunities elsewhere. While some
have been critical of the ‘expert’ nature of Legatum’s advice (e.g. Sandbu 2017), this does not
negate the fact that knowledge claims framed as ‘expertise’ are still informing debates within Gov-
ernment, with ‘experts’ not being universally derided by pro-Brexit actors.
My central argument is therefore that we need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and pol-
itical nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. Drawing on the (social
psychological) constructivist work of Widmaier (2010, 2016), I argue that policy-makers have often
relied on expert knowledge in an eﬀort at ‘technocratic repression’, reducing trade policy to
matters of economic gains and ‘objective’ legal pronouncements to avoid more complex (and
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emotive) discussions around the values embodied in trade policy-making. This is how the Treasury-
advocated models have operated, perpetuating a more ‘transactionalist’ spatial imaginary premised
on the value of the Single Market and Customs Union for the UK’s current NBM. In contrast, what has
made some forms of expertise so appealing to advocates of hard Brexit within the cabinet is that they
appear to have rendered possible trade policy proposals that would (amongst other things) imply
closer association with the Anglosphere, at no signiﬁcant cost to the UK’s trading relationship with
the EU. Attacking such arguments based on the content of their expert knowledge therefore
misses their ultimate appeal to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this ima-
ginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’, deepening the UK NBM.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The following section sets out an aﬀective pol-
itical economy of expert knowledge, stressing how its ‘black box’ nature is often the source of ‘techno-
cratic repression’. However, expertise can also be grafted onto a set of ‘primary’, emotive attachments
to generate a more persuasive ‘cognitive-emotional synthesis’ (Widmaier 2010, 2016). The section then
highlights how diﬀerent spatial imaginaries of the UK fare in terms of their underlying emotional
content. The third section then explores how ‘gravity’ and CGE models represent an exercise in ‘tech-
nocratic repression’. In contrast, and as highlighted in the fourth section, the speciﬁc legal-technical
arguments oﬀered by the Legatum Institute have sought to graft a series of policy proposals onto
the emotive spatial imaginary of the Anglosphere. Legatum has also put forward proposals grounded
in a particular reading of international trade law that would allow the UK to both achieve regulatory
independence and avoid (or at least minimise) new trade barriers with the EU. Both can be grafted
onto hard Brexiteers’ emotive, post-Brexit vision, which may explain why the ideas appear to be
having some resonance in Whitehall. The article concludes by arguing for the need to recognise the
emotional politics of trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation, bringing underlying
value systems into the debate rather than enabling ‘technocratic repression’.
The Aﬀective Political Economy of Expert Knowledge
My starting point is the premise of much constructivist International Political Economy: the impor-
tance of ideas in shaping socioeconomic actors’ interests. According to Blyth (2010), actors face a situ-
ation of pervasive uncertainty in which they cannot simply read their interests from their material
position by assessing the relative probability of certain events occurring (as in situations of ‘risk’).
In the domain of trade policy, several authors have emphasised the importance of experts in
deﬁning what ideas count as ‘authoritative’ in what is generally recognised to be a technocratised
policy ﬁeld. These prominently include economists (together with econometricians) and lawyers
(Hannah et al. 2016).
On the former, De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2015, 2016) have drawn on the work of Beckert (2013a,
2013b) into the ‘management of ﬁctional expectations’. They argue that CGE models, commonly used
to predict the impact of trade agreements, have been a key political tool in promoting the contro-
versial EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Key political ﬁgures presented
the results of one CGE model as a ‘reliable guide’ of the agreement’s impact (De Ville and Siles-
Brügge 2015, p. 655). This ‘ﬁctional expectation’ of economic gain – ‘ﬁctional’, according to
Beckert (2013a, p. 226, emphasis in the original, cited in De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015, p. 657)
because it is ‘necessarily wrong because the future cannot be foreseen’ – served to hide the potential
(and controversial) deregulatory impact of the agreement behind the veneer of expert knowledge.
The modelling not only made optimistic assumptions about the ability of the EU and US to eliminate
barriers to trade and investment between themselves, but eﬀectively reduced any regulatory diﬀer-
ences (whatever their broader social purpose) to being undesirable ‘non-tariﬀ barriers’ to be elimi-
nated. It also relied on data provided by interested parties (business groups) and downplayed
possible distributive impacts by using the device of a single, representative household. The ‘“black
box” feel to CGE models [and arguably other forms of econometric modelling] (Piermantini and
Teh 2005, p. 10) serves to mask the incredible uncertainty underpinning the model’ as well as the
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malleability of their results, which are dependent on underlying assumptions and norms (De Ville and
Siles-Brügge 2015, p. 658).
From within their own ‘black box’ of legal expertise, trade jurists are often presented as oﬀering
settled ‘interpretations’ of what the rules of the global trading system mean (Trommer 2014, p. 7).
Some have even spoken of a self-conscious ‘culture of objectivity’ amongst lawyers participating
in the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism (Lang 2016, pp. 141–145). This masks what some scho-
lars suggest is the socially constructed nature of trade law and the role of legal experts in the process.
Drawing on pluralist legal theory, Wolfe (2005, p. 348) has highlighted how ambiguities and diﬀering
interpretations of WTO law are a normal feature of the system, mediated through ‘a continuous
process of social interaction [beyond formal dispute settlement] in which the parties adjust their
expectations of each other’. Similarly, political scientist De Ville (2012) has stressed how the formal
dispute settlement process of the WTO itself does not impact on domestic regulatory processes in
a straightforward fashion. Rather, particular interpretations around WTO legal provisions on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures (notably the ‘least trade restric-
tiveness criterion’, or the additional requirement to base regulations on international standards or
‘sound science’ in the case of the SPS Agreement) may be rhetorically deployed by domestic
actors seeking deregulation.
These approaches to legal and econometric knowledge highlight the socially mediated nature of
expert claims, their malleability (and dependence on underpinning normative frameworks) and the
political nature of appeals to objectivity (which rest on obscuring the normative foundations of their
expertise, via the ‘black box’ phenomenon). But arguably such constructivist approaches to expertise
neglect non- (or pre-) cognitive elements to expertise, which are key to explaining its role in social
legitimation. As Widmaier (2010, 2016) has argued, expertise often serves to ‘technocratically
repress’ underlying emotions in policy-making, undermining democratic deliberation.
His point of departure is a distinction found in the work of sociologists Berger and Luckmann
(1966) between ‘primary socialisation’ – the ‘formation of unconscious and emotional attachments’
during childhood to ‘notions of ethical values, citizenship rights and the role of the state’ (the
emotional component of legitimation) (Widmaier 2010, p. 133) – and ‘secondary socialisation’ –
the ‘acquisition of role-speciﬁc knowledge’ (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 138, cited in Widmaier
2010, p. 133) that allows policy-makers to put into eﬀect particular economic policies (the cognitive
component of legitimation) (Widmaier 2010, p. 133). Drawing subsequently on the distinction social
psychologist Kahneman (2011) has made between ‘“fast,” aﬀective thinking’ (which may be ‘precog-
nitive’) and ‘“slow,” cognitive reactions’, Widmaier (2016, pp. 16–20) argues that such ‘primary’ values
shape the ‘fast thinking’ ‘principled construction’ of political economic orders by political leaders and
intellectuals. This is followed by a process of ‘intellectual conversion’ where such ‘primary’ ideas are
transformed into the ‘slow thinking’ causal models (and ‘secondary’ knowledge) used by experts to
manage the economy (Widmaier 2016, pp. 20–22).
A ‘cognitive-emotional synthesis’ can therefore provide a ‘foundation of state and societal inter-
ests’ (Widmaier 2010, p. 133). But a reliance on expert knowledge may also reﬂect what he refers
to as the ‘“technocratic repression” of emotional inﬂuences from [policy] debate’ (Widmaier 2010,
p. 129). This is most clearly observed in the case of economic and legal expertise on trade if we
examine the ‘black box’ phenomenon. Technocratic repression is driven by the (unconscious)
‘anxiety’ of policy-makers that there may be a ‘dissonance’ between the ‘emotional’ (primary, fast
thinking) and ‘cognitive’ (secondary, slow thinking) bases of socioeconomic legitimation. Widmaier
(2010) argues that this risks engendering the sorts of breakdown in policy deliberation also identiﬁed
by Hopkin and Rosamond (2017) in their writing about political bullshit.
The Aﬀective Political Economy of UK–EU Relations and the Anglosphere
There is one further element to my framework that will tie the literature on expert knowledge and
‘technocratic repression’ to the case of Brexit: the role of diﬀerent spatial imaginaries of Britain’s
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political economy. One much-cited author in this respect is the political economist Gamble (2003,
p. 2), who has argued that ‘England as an empire state, formed […] at the meeting point of the
four circles of Union, Empire, Anglo-America, and Europe is now reforming and adjusting to new
problems and new challenges’. These challenges included the position of the English ‘world island’
within the EU and Anglo-American political economic spaces. Reﬂecting similar concerns with
space, Baker et al. (2002; see also Adler-Nissen et al. 2017) identify some of the political economic
imaginaries amongst UK elites of Britain’s relationship to globalisation and European regionalism.
The ﬁrst is ‘hyperglobalisation’, the view that ‘the correct policy for Britain […] is to regain parliamen-
tary sovereignty in order to seek to become a deregulated, privatised, oﬀshore island’ by leaving the
EU and its alien, Social Democratic strictures (Baker et al. 2002, pp. 408–410). This is consistent
with the intensiﬁcation of the UK NBM. A second, ‘intergovernmental’ perspective stresses Britain’s
interest in remaining in an EU where both national economic sovereignty is preserved and Single
Market access guaranteed, consistent with the view that the UK’s NBM is well anchored in member-
ship (Baker et al. 2002, pp. 410–413).
This points to the two broad imaginaries deﬁning existing controversies surrounding Brexit within
the UK Government. Firstly, there are those taking a more ‘transactionalist’ view of British EU mem-
bership, seeing its value largely in terms of UK participation in the Single Market. On the other hand,
the growing Thatcherite wing of the Conservative party – which played a key role in the ‘Vote Leave’
campaign and in the UK Government post-referendum – has increasingly adopted not just the
‘hyperglobalist’ position identiﬁed by Baker et al. (2002), but actively embraced a geographic imagin-
ary premised on the Anglosphere (with echoes of both ‘Anglo-America’ and the Commonwealth).
This ‘loose’ ‘political community’ of ‘English-speaking people’ is said to be ‘distinguished by a set
of institutions and characteristics that the other advanced nations of Europe and Asia lack’,
namely common law, a concern for property rights, representative democracy and entrepreneurial-
ism (Wellings and Baxendale 2015, p. 123, 125, 129); closer association is said to oﬀer an attractive
‘alternative to European integration’ (Kenny and Pearce 2018, p. 127). Vucetic (2011, p. 3) has also
written of the historical origins of the Anglosphere as a form of ‘racialised identity’, premised on
‘Anglo-Saxonism’, identifying a limited Anglosphere ‘core’ of (white-majority) nations comprising
the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US. As Kenny and Pearce (2018) point out, there is
a long historical lineage and certain malleability to the term, despite its more recent association
with neoliberal, Eurosceptic Conservativism.
My argument here is to emphasise the aﬀective political economy of both the Anglosphere and
more EU-oriented spatial political economy imaginaries present in UK elite discourse. The former
‘supplied a horizon of possibility and aﬀective ideological content for many Brexiteers’ during the
EU referendum campaign (Kenny and Pearce 2018, p. 157). As Murray-Evans (2016) underscores,
Brexit was presented as an opportunity to right the historic ‘betrayal’ of the Commonwealth
brought about by Britain’s accession to the European Economic Community. The use of such
emotive language points to the important ‘geography-psychology link’ in British Euroscepticism:
while geographically proximate, European nations were perceived as psychologically distant,
while the pursuit of ‘Britain’s global destiny’ brought it closer to the peoples of the Anglosphere
with which it shared ‘cultural and political aﬃnities’ (Daddow 2013, pp. 212–213). Relating this to
the points made above regarding emotions and expert knowledge, the Anglosphere imaginary
increasingly deployed by Eurosceptic Conservatives represents the ‘emotional’ building block
of a possible ‘cognitive-emotional’ synthesis. In contrast, the more transactionalist imaginary of
Britain’s continued interest in EU membership lacks such underpinning emotive content; it
suﬀers from ‘cognitive-emotional dissonance’ that its backers seek to ‘technocratically repress’
(Widmaier 2010) by invoking expert knowledge on the economic beneﬁts of membership. This
may well reﬂect the long-standing ‘anxieties’ of British elites in presenting a political, European
integration project as anything else than a ‘Common (and later, Single) Market’ given domestic
emotive attachments to such notions as ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ (Geddes 2013, pp. 19–42,
59–61).
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The Inexorable Pull of Gravity?
To understand the role played by expert knowledge in serving this more transactionalist perspective
on European integration, I turn to the various forms of econometric modelling used to defend it. First
and foremost comes ‘gravity modelling’, often described as the ‘industry standard empirical frame-
work for the analysis of international trade’ (Egger et al. 2017, p. 533). As the name suggests, it
draws an analogy to physics and the gravitational attraction between two celestial bodies, positing
a positive relationship between the geographical proximity and economic size of two trading part-
ners and the volume of trade between them.
In its most basic incarnation, the gravity equation can be stated as (reproduced from Baier et al.
2008, p. 467, based on Anderson 1979):
PXij = b0(GDPi)b1(GDPj)b2(DISTij)b31ij,
where Pxij relates to the value of trade from exporter i to importer j; DISTij refers to the distance
between the ‘economic centres’ of countries i and j; ε is the error term and β1 = β2 = 1 (indicating
a positive and proportional relationship) and β3 < 0 (indicating a negative relationship). This spe-
ciﬁcation, however, has been argued to suﬀer from signiﬁcant omitted variable biases, skewing
the results. One key amendment, introduced to account for the endogeneity2 of ‘multilateral
resistance’ eﬀects (the trade barriers or costs between a country and the rest of the world),3
has therefore been to estimate country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects using panel data. This accounts for
all time-invariant characteristics of country (including size and distance) (Head and Mayer 2013,
p. 10).
More signiﬁcant here, however, is the fact that much gravity modelling of Brexit has drawn on
scholarly work seeking to rectify another anomaly: the ﬁnding that Economic Integration Agree-
ments (EIAs, a catch-all term covering all preferential trade agreements) have ‘economically and
statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀects […] on trade’ (Baier et al. 2008, p. 464, emphasis in the original).
Baier et al. (2008) attribute this to another omitted variable bias arising from the endogeneity of
EIAs. They argue that this omitted variable might be the ‘intensity of domestic regulations’: restric-
tive regulation both inhibits trade ﬂows, but also provides an incentive for governments to enter
into trade agreements, which biases the error term and thus leads to the ‘underestimat[ion]’ of
the eﬀects of trade agreements (Baier et al. 2008, p. 480, 482). A similar problem arising from endo-
geneity identiﬁed by others has been ‘reverse causality’ – the extent to which one can disentangle
the decision to form a trade agreement from existing levels of trade (HM Treasury 2016, p. 161). To
address these problems and separate out the eﬀects that EIAs have on trade ﬂows, gravity model-
ling of trade agreements has often relied on ‘bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects’ (also known as ‘country-pair’
ﬁxed eﬀects), which account for all time-invariant characteristics of a country-pair, including the
(non-)presence of an EIA.
An alternative to gravity estimations is oﬀered by CGE models, which have also been one of the
‘workhorses’ of international economists studying trade agreements (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015,
pp. 657–658; on the diﬀerences to gravity estimation, see Raza et al. 2014, pp. 35–46). Rather than
estimating the overall eﬀects of such agreements by looking at historical trade ﬂows between
country pairs, such models typically rely on numerical estimates of the impacts of tariﬀs and NTBs
in diﬀerent sectors. These are plugged into a ‘general equilibrium’ framework to yield estimates of
eﬀects on sectoral but also general trade ﬂows, and by extension GDP and employment. Given
the expectations of the Arrow-Debreu theorem, all product, services and labour markets are expected
to clear based on the actions of a single, representative and rationally optimising household/individ-
ual. The emphasis is placed on the ‘allocative eﬃciency’ of eliminating trade restrictions caused by
tariﬀs and NTBs, which allows for net welfare gains. While emphasising allocative eﬃciency rather
than ‘gravity’ – and therefore being premised on a diﬀerent estimation strategy – I should stress
that both the gravity and the CGE model underscore the signiﬁcance of eliminating NTBs as a
means of boosting trade ﬂows and enhancing welfare.
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Econometric Modelling as Technocratic Repression
Gravity models have played an important role in feeding into the cabinet battles over the future of
the UK’s trade policy – as well as some public debate. A key paper circulated at the Brexit cabinet
subcommittee in October 2016 argued that leaving the EU Customs Union would lead to a long-
run reduction in UK GDP of 4.5 per cent (Asthana et al. 2016). This was based on the average of
three pre-referendum studies that relied on gravity models – by the Treasury, researchers at the
National Institute for Economic and Social Research and at the London School of Economics – for
a scenario where the UK joined the European Economic Area (EEA) (Dhingra et al. 2016, Ebell and
Warren 2016, HM Treasury 2016). This arrangement would involve continued participation in the
EU Single Market’s regulatory space, but not the Customs Union, entailing additional barriers not cur-
rently faced by UK ﬁrms related to customs procedures and rules of origin (as argued by the Treasury
in the run-up to the referendum; see HM Treasury 2016, p. 163). More recent Government analysis of
Brexit, the cause of much furore when it was leaked in January 2018, has relied on a new CGE model
rather than gravity modelling. Following criticism of the Treasury’s earlier ‘gravity modelling’, this was
elaborated on a ‘cross-Whitehall’ basis by civil servants working not only in the Treasury but also in
other Government Departments (Exiting the EU Committee 2018, Giles 2018). In addition to showing
signiﬁcant long-term drops in GDP from a ‘hard Brexit’, the study found that new trade agreements
with third countries would not compensate for lost trade with the EU27 (Exiting the EU Committee
2018, p. 14).
Post-referendum, both the gravity and more recent CGE studies have been reported in Remain-
supporting newspapers and touted by similarly inclined think tanks. In addition to the arguments
about the costs of leaving the EU Customs Union, gravity modelling has been used to argue
against a ‘hard Brexit’more generally – both in terms of lost trade ﬂows with the EU and the relatively
smaller gains to be had from new FTAs (Ebell 2016) – as well as the need to prioritise the ‘roll over’ of
existing EU FTAs over new trade agreements (Tetlow 2018). Criticism, of both gravity and the more
recent CGE model, has largely come from (hard) Brexit supporters (e.g. Rees-Mogg 2017). Grant Lewis
and Samuel Lowe (2017) have summarised the mood in much of the pro-Remain commentariat when
they stated that ‘[g]ravity always wins’.
Gravity modelling of Brexit in the run-up to the referendum was remarkably consistent in its
results. While there was some variation in the GDP estimates of the three studies mentioned
above, zooming in on the trade ﬂow ﬁgures does show estimated eﬀects of a very similar order of
magnitude for the diﬀerent scenarios. Diﬀerences in output eﬀects from leaving the EU arose
mainly because of the diﬀerent ways in which the broader models fed these trade eﬀects into
GDP as well as whether the models considered trade eﬀects on FDI, productivity or migration (see
Ebell and Warren 2016, p. 134). A summary of the more recent cross-Whitehall CGE modelling
studies, released in March 2018 by the House of Commons Brexit Committee, also showed that
the scenarios and ﬁndings were broadly in line with these prior gravity studies of Brexit (Exiting
the EU Committee 2018, p. 16).
The modellers themselves have also explicitly presented their work as a reliable indication of the
eﬀects of leaving the EU, without meaningful ‘health warnings’. For example, the executive summary
of the Treasury gravity study spoke of a ‘rigorous and objective economic analysis […] us[ing] a
widely adopted gravity modelling approach’. With ‘a range of realistic assumptions, many of them
cautious, the HM Treasury analysis produces robust estimates’ (HM Treasury 2016, p. 7; see also
Ebell and Warren 2016, p. 123). As for the CGE modelling, the Chancellor has spoken in a positive
tone about the ‘wholly new model’ being built on a ‘cross-departmental’ basis to assess the sectoral,
regional and bilateral impacts of Brexit (cited in Treasury Committee 2017, pp. 23–24).
If we open the modelling ‘black box’, however, there are grounds to be more careful of the epis-
temic status we accord to these econometric exercises. Notably, we ﬁnd that the gravity studies dis-
cussed above mostly rely on country-pair ﬁxed-eﬀect models – often the Baier et al. (2008) article
cited above (or in the case of the Treasury, its own, ‘comparable’ model, HM Treasury 2016,
NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 7
p. 166). This is despite the history of model speciﬁcation in shaping the results of estimation – as dis-
cussed above with regard to attempts to mitigate omitted variable bias (see also Evenett and Keller
2002).4 It is important to underscore that it is speciﬁcation accounting for endogeneity (e.g. using
bilateral ﬁxed eﬀects) that allows modellers to attribute trade creation eﬀects to the formation of
EIAs (and trade reduction eﬀects to the likes of Brexit); previous speciﬁcations often found (as we
have noted above) ‘insigniﬁcant’ eﬀects. Moreover, using instrumental variable estimation of
endogenous PTA formation with spillovers – i.e. the eﬀects of PTAs on the trade of non-members
– leads to diﬀerent results (with greater variation between country pairs) compared to a bilateral
ﬁxed-eﬀects model (Egger et al. 2011).
CGE models’ estimations, for their part, depend on calculating the impacts of tariﬀs and NTBs. For
the latter, this is a notoriously subjective exercise, with the modeller exercising considerable discre-
tion within their ‘black box’ (see Raza et al. 2014, De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015). Very little infor-
mation on the method for calculating NTBs is provided in the summary of the cross-Whitehall
study released by the Brexit Committee, although some of the estimates of additional Brexit-
induced trade costs have been provided (see Exiting the EU Committee 2018, pp. 6–7, 9). Using
very diﬀerent assumptions regarding the impact of Brexit on trade barriers (albeit with a presumably
similar CGE model) – notably that leaving the EU will allow for a reduction in EU-imposed trade costs
of 10 per cent in agriculture and manufacturing – Patrick Minford (2016) (from the group ‘Economists
for Free Trade’, formerly ‘Economists for Brexit’) has even argued that Brexit will boost the UK’s GDP
by 4 per cent. He subsequently wrote a piece entitled ‘Even the new Civil Service approach seems to
show the beneﬁt of Free Trade outside the EU Customs Union’, arguing this would be the case if the
cross-Whitehall CGE modelling was adjusted to reﬂect ‘the right policy assumptions’ (those of Econ-
omists for Free Trade). He accuses the civil service of using ‘absurdly pessimistic Brexit policy assump-
tions to “cook” its anti-Brexit results’. Ironically enough, Minford (2018) also provides a defence of the
Whitehall’s choice of a CGE approach, referring to it as ‘a defensible and improved methodology’.
My argument is not that such models fail to address omitted variable biases; that ‘gravity’ and
NTBs are irrelevant to understanding ﬂows of goods and services across borders or that the Treasury
has ‘cooked’ its results. What I am suggesting is that by being presented as reliable estimates of future
trends around an event, Brexit, which is marked by considerable uncertainty we are dealing with a
political phenomenon. On the modeller side (which includes the Treasury), there is a lack of
‘health warnings’ and boasts of ‘reliability’ and state-of-the-art modelling. Newspapers and think
tanks have similarly picked up on such studies as pointing to ‘inescapable’ economic forces (Lewis
and Lowe 2017, Giles 2018). My argument is that they therefore represent an exercise in ‘managing
ﬁctional expectations’ (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2015).
Crucially, gravity (and CGE) models provide a perspective on European integration that reduces
the EU to just another (to use Baier et al. 2008’s terminology), ‘Economic Integration Agreement’.
Granted, these models do recognise that the EU does go further than other EIAs in addressing
NTBs, but it is simply seen as part of a wider trend of endogenous EIA formation within the
gravity literature – with attendant economic costs from abandoning such a preferential trade
arrangement. In contrast, political scientists have fretted for many years over whether the EU rep-
resents a sui generis form of supranational political organisation (Rosamond 2000, pp. 17–18).
Taking the view of the modellers, the EU is reduced to the economic eﬀects of the Single Market
and Customs Union, premised on ‘negative integration’ (the removal of barriers to trade, rather
than the ‘positive’ construction of a politico-economic space; the typology is from Scharpf 1998).
EU regulatory harmonisation serves the exclusive purpose of reducing barriers to exchange rather
than the broader political imperatives of the EU’s Single Market Programme and the social, environ-
mental or public health objectives that also came to be associated with it (De Ville and Siles-Brügge
2016, pp. 44–51). The political imperatives driving the Six to choose a supranational form of inte-
gration (a customs union with a common agricultural policy) over a free trade area – as happened
with the European Free Trade Association states (Gstöhl 2002) – is also neglected in favour of discus-
sions regarding the impact of rules of origin on trade ﬂows.
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There is an interesting analogy to be drawn here to attempts by the European Commission to
create legitimacy for the EU by constructing a ‘European economic space’ around the conception
of competitiveness (Rosamond 2002), or the broader use of the market to craft legitimacy for supra-
national European institutions (Jabko 2006). These imaginaries rely on the depoliticising language of
‘the market’ (Watson 2017) and have been used to ‘repress’ the distributive impacts of EU external
trade liberalisation (Siles-Brügge 2014). In some contexts, however, more emotive argumentation
has been used by EU actors where they have spoken of the speciﬁcities of the European social
market economy in ‘managing globalisation’ (see Jacoby and Meunier 2010).
In the UK, however, the use of trade modelling has reduced European integration to its econ-
omic contribution to the NBM, particularly manufacturing supply chains (given the modelling of
the eﬀects of leaving the Customs Union) and services (when modelling the impact of leaving the
Single Market). This transactionalist view is premised on ‘technocratically repressing’ any poten-
tial emotional bases to the EU’s political economy (as well as downplaying any distributive con-
sequences of EU membership). It appears rooted in Britain’s ‘pragmatic and instrumental view of
European integration’ in the run-up to and since accession (Geddes 2013, p. 61), ﬁnding clear
expression in the ‘Remain’ camp’s rhetoric during the 2016 EU referendum campaign. This argu-
ably reﬂected elite ‘anxieties’ about the disconnect between the European political integration
project and more British ‘primary’, emotive attachments to such ideas as ‘parliamentary sover-
eignty’. In contrast, the advocates of ‘hard Brexit’ have found experts willing to transform their
‘primary’, emotive attachment to the Anglosphere into cognitive models allowing them to oper-
ationalise an alternative trade policy for the UK.
A ‘Blueprint’ for Trading with the Anglosphere
Part of this eﬀort has been the work of the Legatum Institute – notably that of its Special Trade Com-
mission, created in the aftermath of the referendum result and comprising several former trade policy
oﬃcials. As opposed to the more critical approach to Brexit taken by other trade policy commenta-
tors, the Commission’s self-styled aim is to ‘re-focus the public discussion on Brexit to a positive con-
versation on opportunities, rather than challenges’ (Legatum 2018). Legatum – and especially
Shanker Singham, Legatum’s (now former) Director of Economic Policy and Chairman of the
Special Trade Commission – have been widely reported as having considerable inﬂuence within
Whitehall, particularly within DIT and to an extent DExEU (Leroux and Philp 2017). DIT’s Second Per-
manent Secretary and Chief Trade Negotiation Adviser Crawford Falconer, appointed in June 2017, is
none other than a former member of the Special Trade Commission (HM Government 2017b). He is
also said to share the Commission’s optimistic outlook regarding the trade policy opportunities
oﬀered by Brexit (Leroux and Philp 2017). Due to the diﬃculties of researching a sensitive live
policy area, the following analysis relies on publicly available sources to highlight similarities
between the proposals generated by Legatum and those of Government. It does not rule out
additional sources of inﬂuence on the UK Government and is primarily focused on illustrating the
politicised nature of expert knowledge. In March 2018, Singham and several of his colleagues left
Legatum to set up a new ‘International Trade and Competition Unit’ at the IEA (IEA 2018).
Anti-competitive Market Distortions and the Anglosphere
While ‘gravity modellers’ have focused on the impacts that trade barriers have on cross-border trade
ﬂows, especially NTBs, the starting point for Legatum’s studies are broader ‘anti-competitive market
distortions’ (ACMDs). This is a concept that Singham and other members of the Commission have
been developing over several years (Falconer and Sauvé 1996, Abbott and Singham 2013). ACMDs
are said to have three principal eﬀects: ‘to limit the number and range of competitors; to restrict
the ability of individual companies to compete by artiﬁcially increasing their costs or artiﬁcially low-
ering competitors’ costs; and to favour state-owned enterprises’ (Singham and Kiniry 2016, p. 3)
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The concept of ACMDs lies at the heart of Legatum’s overarching trade policy proposal to create a
‘prosperity zone’ of ‘like-minded countries’ (Singham et al. 2017a, p. 11). Referred to elsewhere also as
a ‘Prosperity-Enhancing Partnership’, this would involve an ‘anti-distortions agreement’ ‘among
countries that are disposed to accept the foundational pillars of classical liberalism – property
rights protection, open trade at the border, and competition on the merits inside the border’
(Singham and Kiniry 2016, p. 26). It would eliminate tariﬀs amongst participating countries as well
as feature provisions to tackle ACMDs, which ‘particularly aﬀect services exports’ (Singham et al.
2017a, p. 6). The ﬁrst wave of countries identiﬁed for negotiations are none other than a majority
of Anglosphere states: the US, Australia, Canada, Singapore, New Zealand (‘and possibly Switzerland’),
with movement ‘gradually towards a Commonwealth Free Trade Zone’ (Singham and Kiniry 2016,
p. 26, 27). Negotiating an FTA with the US is also identiﬁed as a ‘stepping stone’ towards a larger Pros-
perity Zone (Singham et al. 2017a, p. 12), as is acceding to the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (TPP)
(Singham 2017, p. 18).
This can be seen as an attempt to operationalise the ‘primary’ values of key ‘hyperglobalists’within
the Conservative Party, notably the International Trade Secretary Liam Fox, especially as Singham
(2016) was ‘reluctantly’ supportive of Remain prior to the referendum. The concept of an ACMD as
deployed here can be thought of as the ‘intellectual conversion’ of a primary attachment to the
Anglosphere and the political economy model it implies into the ‘secondary’ knowledge needed
to craft speciﬁc trade policy proposals (Widmaier 2016, pp. 20–22). In the words of the title of one
of Legatum’s policy papers, the aim is to provide ‘A Blueprint for UK Trade Policy’ (Singham 2017).
Such a potential ‘cognitive-emotional’ synthesis has two elements. Firstly, the ACMD concept
oﬀers the promise of a radically diﬀerent spatial political economy of trade, less tied to geography.
It is premised on the idea that ‘that the nations of the world are not all equally committed to
open trade, competition on the merits as an organising principle, and property rights protection’
(Singham et al. 2017a, p. 11). What ultimately matters in determining the shape of trade relations
with a third party is the degree to which a state shares a commitment to similar notions of political
economic order, not its degree of proximity. Similarly, and while he may not have explicitly referred to
the Anglosphere, Liam Fox has spoken consistently about ‘the beginning of [a] “post geography
trading world” where we are much less restricted in having to ﬁnd partners who are physically
close to us’ as a result of advances in technology (Fox 2016).
Secondly, the ACMD concept lends itself to the deregulatory agenda associated with ‘hyperglob-
alist’ Conservatism. According to Alden Abbott (a member of Legatum’s Special Trade Commission)
and Singham (2013, p. 26, emphasis added), ACMDs ‘involve government actions that empower
certain private interests to obtain or retain artiﬁcial competitive advantages over their rivals, be
they foreign or domestic’. While the NTB concept found in gravity and CGE modelling relates to regu-
latory barriers that inhibit cross-border trade (and thus add to trade costs in the gravity/CGE frame-
works) – and in their broadest sense might be conceived of as meaningful ‘regulatory diﬀerence
between countries’ (Lang 2011, p. 227, emphasis added) – the notion of an ACMD relates to any
potential distortion of market competition worthy of elimination.
Legatum’s trade policy publications are peppered with references to speciﬁc EU ACMDs, notably
SPS measures. Here the UK is said to stand to beneﬁt considerably from adopting a science-based
approach to risk management by abandoning the EU’s precautionary principle (Singham et al.
2017a, p. 14). Fox has himself also made remarks on the issue of food safety that seem to suggest
he favours a science-based approach. In relation to an EU ban, he has noted that ‘[t]here are no
health reasons why you could not eat chicken that had been washed in chlorinated water […] [a]s
long as scientists tell us it is safe, then I think that should be our guiding principle’ (International
Trade Committee 2017, p. 11).
While DIT has been more circumspect about deregulation, ‘post geography’ and Anglosphere-
centred thinking have already been reﬂected in its policy initiatives. As early as March 2017, The
Times reported on supposed plans to not only negotiate an FTA with African Commonwealth
states by a spring 2018 Commonwealth summit (said to have been mockingly dubbed ‘empire
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2.0’ by oﬃcials), but also have the ‘outlines of deals’ with Australia, New Zealand and ‘possibly’
Canada ready at this stage (Coates and Leroux 2017). DIT has also already established trade
policy ‘working groups’ with all the ‘core’ (to use Vucetic’s description) Anglosphere countries
(Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US) as well as with India – despite calls for it to do
more to prioritise ‘rolling over’ the many trade agreements it currently beneﬁts from as an EU
Member State (Blitz 2017, International Trade Committee 2018). There have also been reports
of UK exploratory talks to join the TPP and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
(Mance et al. 2018), the former being one of Legatum’s speciﬁc proposals. This global spatial ima-
ginary is also consistent with the emphasis placed on services trade in the Department’s work (and
in Legatum’s publications; Singham et al. 2017a, p. 6, Singham et al. 2017b, p. 18). According to
Liam Fox, being an advanced, ‘services-based’ economy means that ‘we can aﬀord to seek
closer partnerships with those whose demands complement our output, not necessarily those
who are geographically proximate’ (Fox 2017a).
‘Having Our Cake and Eating it’: Mutual Recognition/Equivalence
DIT’s eﬀorts to explore ‘global’ opportunities are still at a very early stage. Much more pressing is the
future shape of the UK–EU trade relationship, which continues (at the time of writing) to be at the
heart of a crucial cabinet divide between advocates of a ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit. Liam Fox has also
been one of the most ardent defenders of a ‘hard Brexit’, emphasising the constraints a closer econ-
omic association with the EU would impose on the UK’s ability to pursue its future trade policy ambi-
tions (Fox 2018). This is also the view of the Legatum Institute, which has advocated that the ﬁrst step
in the UK’s trade policy should be to leave both the Customs Union (to be able to negotiate agree-
ments covering customs duties), as well as the Single Market ‘to be able to negotiate services trade
deals with other countries’ (Singham 2017, p. 5). Doing neither potentially renders Anglosphere-
centred trade policy ambitions moot.
This is where Legatum’s technical solutions have arguably provided the most immediate ‘intellec-
tual conversion’ for the reﬂexive hyperglobalism of certain Conservative Brexiteers. It has sought to
counter not only the arguments about the economic costs of increased trade barriers with the EU27,
but also to address the concerns that deviating from the EU’s regulatory and customs regime will lead
to the imposition of a ‘hard border’ in Ireland (assuming there is not one in the Irish Sea) as customs,
veterinary and other regulatory checks will need to take place in accordance with the EU acquis
(Gasiorek 2018). This is underscored by the commitments undertaken by the UK Government in
the ﬁrst phase of EU withdrawal negotiations to ‘maintain full alignment with those rules of the
Internal Market and the Customs Union which […] support North–South cooperation, the all-island
economy and the protection of the [Good Friday] Agreement’ (EU and HM Government 2017,
p. 8). My focus here, for reasons of space, is on the conundrum thrown up by regulatory, rather
than customs, issues (although Legatum has also proﬀered some solutions to these, see Singham
and Hewson 2017, pp. 13–18, 22–24).
When it comes to UK trade policy vis-à-vis third parties, issues of regulatory divergence are dis-
cussed most prominently with respect to a prospective UK-US FTA. Although the existence and
extent of a ‘transatlantic regulatory divide’ in risk regulation has been much debated in the academic
literature (e.g. Young 2009, Vogel 2012), the prospect of a post-Brexit regulatory re-alignment by the
UK does underscore certain important diﬀerences. The starkest probably relate to the SPS regime,
and the diﬀerences between the EU’s precautionary/hazard-based and the US’s ‘sound science’/
risk-based models, which have signiﬁcantly inhibited US agricultural exports to the EU. This precau-
tionary/sound science divide also cuts across other areas (such as chemicals regulation). Similarly, the
EU and the US have very diﬀerent approaches to technical standardisation and conformity assess-
ment (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, pp. 68–71).
Legatum’s solution to the trade-oﬀs thrown up by these diﬀerent regulatory models is what it calls
a system of ‘dual-facing regulation and inter-operability’: ‘[t]he challenge is […] to agree regulatory
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recognition between the UK and EU on the basis that the regulatory systems meet the same objec-
tives, even if the detail of technical regulation diverges’. Crucially, Legatum argues that for some regu-
lation the WTO all but requires such mutual recognition/equivalence5 under these circumstances
(when regulation is covered by the SPS Agreement) – and in other cases at least strongly encourages
it (the TBT Agreement) or explicitly allows for it (when dealing with the General Agreement on Trade
in Services, ‘[w]here recognition [...] given to one country [...] must be made available to other
countries that meet the same criteria’) (Singham et al. 2017c, pp. 18–19; see also Singham et al.
2017a, p. 48).
However, as Trachtman (2007, p. 787) underscores, ‘[t]he WTO has itself eﬀected little positive inte-
gration, either in the form of harmonization (other than in intellectual property rights) or in the form
of requirements of mutual recognition’. Writing speciﬁcally about the stipulation in Article 4 of the
SPS Agreement referenced by Legatum as compelling recognitions of equivalence, he goes on to
argue that ‘it is unclear that this provision has had signiﬁcant eﬀect’ (Trachtman 2007, p. 787). Refer-
encing the TBT Agreement, Legatum itself recognises that ‘the prospect of […] claims [due to non-
recognition of equivalence] remains relatively remote at this stage’, although it is quick to stress that
‘business organisations […] are already using WTO agreements for additional leverage’ (Singham
et al. 2017a, p. 49). This broader political context, however, is generally masked, by making repeated
appeals to the text of WTO agreements without much further clariﬁcation. What, understood in their
appropriate socio-legal context, are a series of provisions with little political repercussions (so far) for
the regulatory systems of WTO members are thus treated as a ‘black box’ of ‘objective’ law to which
the UK as a member may have recourse post-Brexit to pursue its desired trade policy.
Despite their limitations, such legal arguments appear to be reﬂected in the speciﬁc policy variant
adopted by key ﬁgures in the UK Government of the ‘having your cake and eating it’ approach heard
prominently since the referendum campaign (Elgot and Rankin 2016): that the UK can maintain its
current trading arrangements with the EU without being a member and at little to no cost. It is pre-
mised on the idea that instead of pursuing the EU’s supposedly preferred mode of regulatory
cooperation premised on harmonisation – the adoption of a common standard within the Single
Market – the EU and UK should (in many areas) simply aim for the mutual recognition/equivalence
of substantive standards and conformity assessment. This is said to be a key part of the Government’s
‘three buckets’ approach to Brexit, ﬁrst outlined in Theresa May’s September 2017 Florence speech
but subsequently also agreed at the February 2018 Chequers meeting. Amongst other things, the
speech outlined one bucket of rules ‘where we share the same [regulatory] goals but want to
achieve them through diﬀerent means’. According to reports of the Chequers meeting, mutual rec-
ognition of EU and UK rules is meant to prevail here (May 2017b, Parker and Barker 2018, see also May
2018).
Turning to the conundrums thrown up by the Irish border, shortly before the phase 1 UK–EU
agreement David Davis stressed that ‘[a]lignment isn’t harmonisation. It isn’t having exactly the
same rules. It is sometimes having mutually recognised rules, mutually recognised inspection –
that is what we are aiming at’ (Davis 2017, cited in Asthana et al. 2017). This echoes DExEU’s
August 2017 Brexit position paper on ‘Northern Ireland and Ireland’, in which it pitched the idea
of ‘regulatory equivalence on agrifood [SPS] measures’ (HM Government 2017a, p. 19). A similar
approach to mutually recognising ﬁnancial services regulatory and supervisory arrangements is
also being contemplated by the Government. Although this is based on a speciﬁc proposal devel-
oped by the International Regulatory Strategy Group (Parker and Brunsden 2018), Legatum has
also produced similar proposals based on ‘dual regulation coordination’ (Singham et al. 2017b,
p. 5). Finally, the UK’s trade policy towards non-EU parties also appears to be premised on promoting
such mutual recognition/equivalence as opposed to harmonisation (see International Trade Commit-
tee 2017, p. 14, Fox 2018).
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Conclusion
Battles within the UK Government on the nature of the UK’s trading relationship with the EU and the
wider world have involved appeals to rival forms of ‘expertise’ and aﬀective spatial political econom-
ies. This might confound the expectations of a number of commentators and scholars of the post-
Brexit landscape, described as ‘post-truth’, hostile to experts and marked by an appeal to ‘political
bullshit’ (Hopkin and Rosamond 2017). This article has stressed the malleability and political use of
expert knowledge, emphasising the importance of understanding its emotional underpinnings. It
has argued that despite being derided in some quarters, the legal arguments (about mutual recog-
nition/equivalence) and concepts (such as ACMDs) oﬀered by key individuals at Legatum provided
for the cognitive ‘intellectual conversion’ necessary to turn hard Brexiteers’ emotive, ‘primary’ attach-
ment to the Anglosphere into speciﬁc trade policy proposals. This is not a comment on the feasibility
of such proposals, but rather a statement on how they provide a persuasive ‘cognitive-emotional’
synthesis for key political actors within the UK Government formulating post-Brexit trade policy
(although the article has not sought to argue that this is the only source of inﬂuence on hard Brexi-
teers in the Government). The appeal to ‘gravity’ and the EU as a project of negative economic inte-
gration premised on the elimination of NTBs, tariﬀs and rules of origin – on the other hand – suﬀers
from being an exercise in ‘technocratic repression’ that lacks such a powerful emotive basis.
A clear outline of the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy will likely still take some time to emerge as these
intra-Government battles are fought out and the UK negotiates with the EU27. But whether the UK
Government goes down the ‘Global Britain’ path of deepening the deregulatory aspects of the UK’s
NBM, chooses a softer Brexit and maintains much of the status quo or does something else altogether
will likely depend less on the ‘intellectual garbage disposal’ eﬀorts of experts (Portes 2017) and more
on whether the policies pursued appeal to the ‘primary’, emotive attachments of policy-makers and
the public. While trade policy did not have the prominence of immigration during the referendum
campaign, it is an issue with the potential to be politicised. None other than Liam Fox has stressed
that ‘we need to sell our vision and our mission to a public that is often either unaware or sceptical
about the beneﬁts of free trade, and […] we have to go beyond the simple economics into [a] moral
argument’ (2017b). He has also invoked the legitimation issues that plagued TTIP (see Elgot 2017).
Here civil society organisations were successful at contesting the agreement precisely because
they appealed to individuals’ sense of anger with an ‘injustice frame’ premised on the threat the
agreement posed to democracy (including democratically established levels of social, environmental
and consumer protection) (Siles-Brügge 2018). Moreover, the ‘hard Brexit’ favoured by Fox and others
raises not only such ‘normative’ policy considerations, but also ‘distributive’ questions (see De Ville
and Siles-Brügge 2016, p. 100). It potentially favours interests that would beneﬁt from deregulation
(e.g. some in the City, see James and Quaglia 2018) at the expense of others, including farmers
exposed to increased competition and manufacturing industries and their workers excluded from
EU supply chains. The potential for politicisation here is also clear given that the pro-Brexit referen-
dum result involved a ‘coalition’ ‘between two largely antithetical positions often seen as ideological
rivals’: the economic nationalist rhetoric (‘taking back control’) swaying the ‘left behind’ and hyper-
globalist Euroscepticism (Adler-Nissen et al. 2017, p. 582).
Talk of ‘kith and kin’ has so far obscured deregulatory intentions and ‘Global Britain’s’ potentially
disruptive distributive impacts. A ‘neo-Thatcherite idea of Brexit […] has been rendered considerably
more palatable […] when presented through the narrative and ethos of the English-speaking
peoples’ (Kenny and Pearce 2018, p. 172). Against this, appealing to the ‘immutable’ forces of
‘gravity’ lacks the resonance to engage the public in discussions about trade policy, as it revolves
around a very ‘transactionalist’ spatial imaginary of Britain’s place in the EU. It also ‘technocratically
represses’ the discussion of the economic dislocation caused by trade liberalisation by, at best, redu-
cing it to the trade and GDP impact of Brexit on the UK regions, often framed in terms of the
‘irrational’ behaviour of ‘Leave’ voting areas acting against their material economic interest (Perraudin
2017).
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Arguments are needed that bring policy-makers’ and politicians’ underlying value systems (the
fruit of ‘primary’, emotive socialisation processes) out into the open and are thus more conducive
to democratic deliberation. Critics of hard Brexit wishing to dent the appeal of the Anglosphere
could focus on exposing how its recent embrace by Eurosceptics is bound up in a deep-seated com-
mitment to the unbridled free market capitalism associated with the ‘English-speaking peoples’. This
might involve crafting an emotive ‘injustice frame’ that emphasised the implications of adopting such
a political economic model for peoples’ everyday lived experience: from regulations governing the
protection of natural spaces to food safety standards and the impact of economic dislocation on
peoples’ livelihoods – aiming to elicit the sort of anger that made the TTIP protests successful.6 Exper-
tise should go beyond calling ‘bullshit’ to exposing this ‘Brexit dividend’ (Ganesh 2018).
Notes
1. For more on the literature on ‘bad ideas’ in public policy, see Hopkin and Rosamond (2017, p. 3).
2. Endogeneity refers to where the error term is correlated to one of the explanatory variables, leading to biased
estimation.
3. The economic size of a country is not unrelated to its sensitivity to increased trade barriers on trade ﬂows (Ander-
son and van Wincoop 2003, p. 171).
4. I would like to thank Bernhard Tröster for his help on this point.
5. Strictly speaking, mutual recognition (the reciprocal acceptance by two parties of their respective rules) can be
diﬀerentiated from equivalence (which refers to the acceptance by one party of the rules of another).
However, both terms imply accepting that ‘although diﬀerent in form [the rules] […] are equivalent in eﬀect’
(Young 2017, p. 42) and are often used interchangeably (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016, p. 144).
6. Such arguments have begun to be articulated by NGOs previously critical of the TTIP negotiations (e.g. Trade
Justice Movement 2017).
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